The Tenure Issue

Tenure is an issue mostly associated with academic freedom, and the achievement of tenure in an American university is often associated with the ability to teach and do research on topics that, prior to tenure, may have negatively affected one's academic career. The question of whether or not tenure remains an appropriate system for the United States is not one we're addressing here. Instead, we will relate a few ways in which the tenure system affects the progress of science through government funding. Even though the US Government has no official position on tenure in relation to reviewing proposals or getting research funding, there are still strong relationships to be recognized between tenure and the overall progress of science.

Prior to being awarded tenure, junior faculty seek to publish as much as possible in order to build a strong case for being awarded tenure. This effect of the tenure process is good for the progress of science for all the obvious reasons already mentioned earlier in this blog. What someone publishes is also of critical importance as well as how much they publish. If a junior faculty member publishes too much out of scope of the discipline of their potential tenure committee, this will likely negatively affect their tenure case. Tenure committees normally seek to strengthen the field they represent rather than have it change or even evolve by accepting for tenure someone who may be considered to be on the "fringe" of the field, or worse, outside the field. In this respect, the tenure process reflects the political reality of how it proceeds. Tenure committees are actually not unlike small political parties in this sense, seeking to increase the influence and direction that they already represent. For funding programs seeking to diversify a field or to generate interdisciplinary fields, this is a strong negative influence. Rarely will you find a junior faculty member willing to step outside the bounds of their potential tenure committee to seek funding for a revolutionary interdisciplinary idea. When this does happen, it is usually a natural combination, such as a combination of the field with teaching, with computation, or with the collection and sharing of large data sets. Rarely is it a combination involving two core sciences. Bioinformatics is one major exception, being a combination of biology and information science. Even in this case, however, it wouldn't have happened had it not already become obvious after the genomic era that biology is an information science anyway.

There are also influences on government funding of science after the award of tenure. While one would expect a newly-tenured faculty member to begin to diversify and take more risk in their approaches, that is not normally observed. Possibly the reason is that, after spending 7 years keeping tightly within the bounds of a field, they have become fully enculturated in the field and no longer aspire to change. Innovation becomes more of a challenge when a faculty member already has PhD students to supervise, classes to teach, and now service on the tenure committee that keeps them focused on the field.

One outcome of tenure that has to be mentioned because it is so noticeable from the point of view of government funders is that of ego. Achievement of tenure is a difficult and highly political process. When successful, the faculty member is treated differently both by those within the University as well as by those in the field. Such treatment is almost like that of royalty. That may seem overly strong a label, but the actual fealty shown by junior faculty, not yet tenured, can be a strong and potentially negative influence on one's personality. A tenured faculty member is not only going to serve on a tenure committee in their own university, they will be asked for letters of reference by other tenure committees in other universities representing the field. They will serve as either editors or reviewers of major journals in the field. And, unfortunately, they also tend to serve more often on review committees for funding. While program managers should try to include junior faculty as much as possible to teach them how to write fundable proposals, program managers like to "score points" with the field by selecting reviewers who have recognition in the field, and those people are likely to be tenured. For tenured faculty with weak egos to begin with, all this recognition can create an egotist. I have worked equally in industry, academia, and government, and I have never encountered stronger egos, in the negative sense, than I have in academia, and this should be of concern for government funders.

Government funding of science is aimed at progress in the field, but achievement of progress can be hindered by not only the inertia effect of the tenure process, but even more by the influence of very strong egos. Big names in a field are likely to influence outcomes just because of their name rather than because of reasoned argumentation. Ego-tainted, big names tend to make matters worse by influencing outcomes to increase their own standing and entourage in the field. Only the competitive nature of government funding can control this since, having tenure, faculty are protected in their university position. Program managers must immunize themselves to these processes when they direct funding.

US Government Corruption in Funding of Science?

A question I have been asked is whether or not there is corruption in US Government funding of science. This is an expected question in an era of public scrutiny of government and its spending. I can only comment on what I have actually observed since this sort of thing is not usually published, if it exists at all. My experiences along these lines are with the National Science Foundation, DARPA, DHS, and the Intelligence Community, and the answer is that I have seen wrongful activity in the funding of science in the US, but my answer requires elaboration.

In the National Science Foundation, when corruption occurs, which I believe is rare there, it is intensely pursued by an independent Inspector General's office. For the one serious case I observed, there was an investigation in which I was interviewed as a witness. I don't know what the outcome was, but I believe that, if wrongful acts were found, they were dealt with appropriately. Program Managers in the NSF are required to attend annual workshops where they are given case studies to consider. Most of such case studies are, on the surface, open to interpretation, but at the core, either a criminal act or at least an ethical violation. I trust the NSF system because there are a large number of ways in which the NSF Inspector General gets information about potential problems, and their investigations are thorough, detailed, and unbiased.

The matters in the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community are very different. It's not that there are more violations, or that there is no Inspector General whose job it is to carry out investigations. There is an IG in every US Government Agency. The problem, I believe, stems from the nature of the business. Almost all staff in these organizations, including program managers, are required to hold active security clearances due to the nature of the research they fund and it's potential impact on National Security. This means that only those who "need to know" actually learn about research projects or their outcomes until, or unless, they are published in the open literature. The circle of those who "need to know" is usually tightly controlled, creating a structural problem for detecting and dealing with corruption - i.e., the number of those involved is far smaller, resulting in a much smaller sampling of people from various disciplines or points of view. This means that those who are involved have to be much more vigilant and willing to report potential problems than, say, those in the National Science Foundation.

Does it work? Are these people more vigilant such that wrongful acts are detected, investigated, and dealt with properly? In cases I've observed, I'd have to say no, unfortunately. The same system that protects National Security also provides a shield that prevents disclosure, and humans, being what they are, always have a certain degree, even if small, of stepping over the line in cases in which they are personally involved. Sure, we all go over the speed limit at times, but these cases are more than being a few miles over a posted limit. The cases I've observed were serious, in my opinion. Such cases were justified by those involved by self rationalizations having to do with importance of the work, going with a research performer they "trust" with such important work rather than follow required procedure, or simply the need to take such risks in order to get important work done at all since it may be of the type not many others wish to engage in.

The US system of security works well in cases where it has to, but it must be recognized that it has unintended side effects such as these. Some might say there are whistle-blower protections, and observed cases must be reported. At what cost? Is someone to risk not just their career, but a potential criminal prosecution just to provide this information? I don't think so. The risks are far to great for anyone I know of to make statements regarding potential wrong-doing they've observed. I suppose if the case were to involve loss of life or flagrant criminality, the result might be different, but funding of science usually does not involve that level of seriousness. It is, however, misuse of taxpayer dollars, and that in itself may be reason enough for a serious reconsideration of how the US funds research in agencies having to do with National Security.